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This paper estimates the prevalence of asymmetric information in a 
consumer credit market using a field experiment of our design.  A major 
South African lender issued 60,000 direct mail offers where the interest 
rate was randomized along two different dimensions — an initial “offer 
rate” on the direct mail solicitation, and a weakly lesser “contract rate” the 
applicant received after responding to the solicitation and agreeing to the 
initial offer rate.  These two dimensions of random variation in interest 
rates, combined with the large sample (including 6,200 accepted offers) 
and complete knowledge of the Lender’s information set, will enable us to 
identify the prevalence and impacts of specific types of private 
information.  Specifically, our setup distinguishes adverse selection from 
moral hazard/repayment burden effects on repayment and profitability, 
and thereby generates unique empirical evidence on the sources and 
importance (or lack thereof) of asymmetric information.  
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) launched a cottage industry of theoretical papers on the 
role of asymmetric information in credit markets.  Nevertheless, empirical tests of these 
theories remain relatively rare and inconclusive.  Chiappori and Salanie (forthcoming) 
find this to be true for contract theory in general, and for tests of adverse selection and 
moral hazard in particular.  Two types of problems have hindered the development of 
such empirical work.  First, measuring observables has proven difficult.  The 
econometrician typically falls short of obtaining precise data on what the lender (or 
insurer, or buyer) can and does observe, and she subsequently struggles to make the 
accurate distinction between public and private information that is necessary to test 
theories of asymmetric information.  Second, identifying distinct effects of adverse 
selection and moral hazard is difficult even when precise data on underwriting criteria 
and clean variation in terms are available, as a single interest rate (or insurance policy 
variable) might produce both selection and incentive effects that are of independent 
interest.  Hence, even random variation in interest rates (as in Ausubel, 1999) is not 
sufficient to decompose any reduced-form effect of the interest rate into its structural 
components. 
 
We address these two problems by working with a South African lender of high-
interest, unsecured term credit to generate a unique dataset designed specifically to 
identify the prevalence and impacts of private information.  The Lender’s clients 
comprise employed, but primarily poor, South African consumers who do not have 
access to the formal banking sector. We are privy to the Lender’s credit scoring model 
and full database of actual and potential customers.  Consequently, we are able to 
construct accurate measures of both the Lender’s information set and the outcomes of 
interest (e.g., loan take-up, loan repayments, and profitability).  Moreover, the Lender 
implemented a “market field experiment” of our design whereby the interest rates offered 
in solicitations and contracted upon in actual transactions varied randomly and 
differentially. This experiment was pilot tested in July 2003 and fully implemented 
between October and December 2003.  The unique research design allows us to 
disentangle selection from incentive effects on repayment. 
 
Specifically, we randomized the interest rate on lending contracts at two points.  
First, the Lender solicited 60,000 former clients through direct mail.  The interest rate on 
these offers varied randomly and widely, from 3.25 percent per month to 11.75 percent 
per month.  The Lender typically lends at interest rates between 7.75 percent and 11.75 
percent per month depending on the term of the loan (four, six, or twelve months) and the 
prior repayment history of the client. 
 
The second randomization, which is critical to our identification of adverse 
selection, occurred after a client accepted the terms of the loan solicitation.  Loan 
applications were taken and assessed via the Lender’s branch network, and per its normal 
underwriting procedures.  In particular, the decision to grant credit, and the maximum 
loan amount and term offered to creditworthy clients, were determined based on the 
interest rate that would have been assigned in the absence of the field experiment.  Then, 
some (but not all) clients were randomly assigned a contract interest rate that was lower than the one presented on their mailer, while the loan size and term were held fixed.  This 
assignment was done “double blind,” so that neither the client nor the loan officer knew 
whether the client would receive a lower rate until after the initial loan terms had been 
agreed upon.  This second randomization allows us to cleanly distinguish adverse 
selection from repayment burden, since some clients will select on different interest rates 
ex-ante, but then have identical repayment burdens ex-post, while other clients will select 
on the same rate ex-ante, but have different repayment burdens ex-post. 
 
Formally, our research design is constructed to identify the selection and incentive 
effects of interest rates by randomly assigning solicited and contracted rates to potential 
borrowers (“borrowers”), holding everything else constant.  Our basic model takes the 
form: 
 
(1) Yi = f(Xi, Bb, ri
o, ri
a, Li, Ti, Gi, Pi),  
 
where i indexes borrowers.  Y is an outcome of interest, namely a measure of repayment 
or demand, as detailed below.  X is a vector of observable borrower characteristics.  B is 
branch fixed effect.  r
o is the rate offered on the “pre-qualified” mail solicitation; r
a =< r
o 
is the rate actually contracted upon loan approval; and L and T are the maximum loan 
size and term (4, 6, or 12 months) offered and contracted upon, respectively.
1  L and T 
are bounded by the Lender’s standard underwriting criteria and interest rates, and these 
bounds are set “double blind” with respect to r
a; i.e., r
a is not revealed to either the loan 
underwriter or the potential client until the underwriter has decided whether grant credit, 
and if yes on what terms.  G is a binary variable equal to 1 if ri
a is less than the Lender’s 
standard rate for someone with i’s risk profile.  P is a binary variable equal to 1 if ri
a will 
apply to all of i’s loans with the Lender within the next year, conditional on repayment 
(and equal to zero if ri
a applies only to the initial loan). 
 
In testing for effects of asymmetric information, the primary outcomes of interest 
are related to repayment and profit, as measured by delinquency (late payment), 
chargeoffs, refinancings, loan revenue, and operating profit (loan revenue minus 
administration and collection costs).  We will exploit the random variation in r
o and r
a to 
identify any effects of adverse selection and repayment burden on these outcomes.   
Specifically, r
o identifies the selection effect, and r
a the reduced-form effect of repayment 
burden.  Below we briefly sketch the intuition for how this works, following the relevant 
references.  The paper will present a more formal derivation of the testable predictions. 
 
r
o actually identifies the reduced-form combination of two underlying selection 
parameters of interest.  One is the Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) adverse selection effect, whereby 
repayment probabilities decrease with interest rates under limited liability as higher rates 
induce unobservably less risky borrowers to drop out of the applicant pool.  In the 
absence of compelling empirical evidence on the existence of this effect in comparable 
markets, our priors on its importance in the setting under consideration here should be 
agnostic.  This uncertainty is reinforced by the institutional features of the Lender’s 
market.  On one hand, several aspects of contracting environment appear consistent with 
                                                 
1 An upcoming experiment will randomly assign L, the maximum loan size offered. the presence of Stiglitz-Weiss adverse selection (rationing; and a very limited menu of 
contracts, including an inability to take collateral); on the other hand, the applicant pool 
may have already revealed their types in previous transactions with the Lender.
2  The 
second potential selection component is a “lemons” effect a la Ausubel (1991), where 
given the presence of private information generated from lending relationships a single 
deviating lender would find that reducing rates attracts ex-ante unobservably worse 
repayment risks, since competing lenders will match the rate reduction only for the better 
risks.  Our prior is that the lemons effect is unimportant for the Lender, since empirical 
evidence suggests strongly that lenders in this market simply do not make price 
concessions, even for good customers.  Nevertheless we will take the possibility of a 
lemons effect seriously by examining whether the reduced-form selection effect varies by 
outside debtholding status (observed via credit bureau data) at the time of application. 
 
r
a identifies the reduced-form impact of repayment burden via a combination of 
several underlying structural parameters of interest.  The incentive effects of repayment 
burden work through the (potential) borrower’s project management and repayment 
choices.  Project management choices are defined as those that impact returns.  Higher 
interest rates will produce moral hazard in project choice (conditional on effort) if 
borrowers prefer mean-preserving spreads in project returns under limited liability 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  Similarly, higher interest rates reduce effort (conditional on 
project choice), by producing “debt overhang” that reduces borrower returns in successful 
states (Ghosh et al., 2000).  Repayment choice simply refers to the fact that voluntary 
default, conditional on project returns, becomes more attractive under limited 
enforcement as repayment burden increases (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981, Ghosh and Ray, 
2001).  In contrast, the income effect of repayment burden has nothing to do with choice; 
it works mechanically, by simply increasing the probability that a borrower with 
uncertain cash flow will be unable to repay.  Note that each of these hypothesized 
incentive and income effects works in the same direction — a higher repayment burden 
decreases the probability of repayment. 
 
Of course, if we find a significant reduced-form effect of repayment burden, then 
distinguishing among the structural channels will prove interesting.  We will undertake 
such analysis using at least three complementary methods.  First, we have randomly 
assigned repeat contracting opportunities at preferential, experimental rates, conditional 
on previous repayment performance.  In other words, a random subset of project 
borrowers (those with G*P = 1) will be granted the opportunity to borrow multiple times 
at lower-than-standard rates, provided that they remain in good standing on their previous 
loan.
3  This provides an additional, marginal incentive  to repay.  Second, we have 
collected data on utilization of loan proceeds and will use this to estimate whether project 
choice varies with the contracted interest rate.  Third, finding statistically and 
economically significant reduced-form effects of repayment burden would motivate 
additional data collection on income risk. 
                                                 
2 This motivates our ongoing effort to extend the experiment to potential borrowers who have not 
previously transacted with the Lender. 
3 This is in keeping with Lender’s standard underwriting criteria, which automatically rejects any potential 
borrower that fails to pay back a previously granted loan.  
Our approach to estimating the extent and nature of asymmetric information is 
thus most similar in intent to Edelberg (2003), and in methodology to Ausubel (1999).  
Edelberg estimates a structural model that attempts to disentangle the effects of adverse 
selection and moral hazard in collateralized U.S. consumer credit markets, and finds 
evidence consistent with both phenomena.  Ausubel uses market experiments conducted 
by a large American credit card lender to estimate the extent and nature of adverse 
selection.  He does not attempt to account for repayment burden separately, arguing that 
any such effect must be trivially small over the range of interest rates (800 basis points) 
contracted on in his data.  In contrast, our experiment generates variation in both the 
quantity (12,000 basis points) and quality (different rates offered versus contracted) 
required to separately identify any effects of adverse selection and repayment burden. 
 
The takeup phase of this experiment concluded in December 2003, yielding a 
solicitation hit rate of over 10%.  This means that the experiment has produced a sample 
of over 6,000 loans that can be used to estimate the prevalence of asymmetric 
information as described above.  Since 81% of these loans are four months in duration, 
we will have most of the repayment data needed to conduct our analysis by May 2004. 
 